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THE OPIUM WAR IN CHINA: AN ANALYSIS OF GREAT BRITAIN'S  
USE OF WAR AS AN ELEMENT OF POWER

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARVEY R. CARTER, SC

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**USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER**

**THE OPIUM WAR IN CHINA: AN ANALYSIS OF GREAT BRITAIN'S USE OF WAR AS AN  
ELEMENT OF POWER**

**AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT**

**by**

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**30 April 1990**

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ABSTRACT

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# THE OPIUM WAR IN CHINA: AN ANALYSIS OF GREAT BRITAIN'S USE OF WAR AS AN ELEMENT OF POWER

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

During the period 1839-1842, Britain and China were engaged in a war that has become known as the Opium War. This war has become historically significant as the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the first treaty China had signed since 1688, had broken the traditional isolation of the Chinese Empire and opened China's doors to Western culture and trade. To most historians this denotes the opening chapter to China's modern history.

From the Chinese perspective, the war is appropriately named as China became engaged in the war to eliminate opium from her shores in an effort to free her society from the grip the dreaded drug had on it. This perspective is quite legitimate as the opium trade was illegal, but should have taken on a different complexion when it began to involve forceable detention and expulsion of British merchants from China. This included complete refusal of any diplomatic efforts to solve the problem. In reality, the Opium War has served to embitter Chinese patriots for more than a century. They view the war as a stark, simple, black and white act of Chinese victimization. Although, they will admit it is probable that Anglo-Chinese hostilities would have occurred even if there had been no opium trade.<sup>1</sup>

From the British perspective, calling it an Opium War is misleading as Britain had not entered the war to allow opium trade. A better name would be the Anglo-Chinese War as Britain had entered the war to seek free trade and a long overdue equality between the governments of the two nations. If such equality had been

granted during earlier attempts, it is possible that ordinary diplomatic negotiations would have produced a settlement without a need for the war. John Quincy Adams, as American Secretary of State, declared that opium was a mere incident to the dispute, but no more the cause of the war than the throwing overboard of tea in the Boston Harbor was the cause of the American Revolution. The real cause of the war was the kowtow.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the emotional, controversial, and divergent points of view, from a broad perspective, the Opium War was a clash between two different cultures. China was agricultural, confucian, stagnate, and waist-deep in the quicksand of a dynastic cycle. The disintegrating economic, political, and social factors were already at work. Britain was industrial, capitalistic, progressive, and restless. When the two cultures met, conflict and the defeat of China were inevitable.<sup>3</sup>

So the inevitable war was fought with Britain gaining equality and freedom of trade. For China, the Opium War exposed the inviability of the Manchu regime, the stagnation of Chinese technology, and the inadequacy of the national military system. It brought humiliation, economic catastrophe, and further subjection to opium.

Nonetheless, the war has put a stain on Britain's honorable history, a stain that also belongs equally to other nations to include the United States and France who were also involved in the illegal opium trade. However, China's history also deserves a stain from the corrupt Chinese officials that allowed the opium trade to progress for their kickback, even though they fully knew it was illegal.

This rebuff to Britain and China's honorable history provides adequate incentive for an analysis of this war from a historical perspective to determine the implications of military intervention and the use of force as an extension of British foreign policy in China.

## CHAPTER II

### BACKGROUND

#### CHINESE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE WAR

By the advent of the nineteenth century, the Chinese Empire, under the helm of the Manchu Dynasty, was beginning to deteriorate economically, socially, and politically, and was in an overall state of decline. The Emperor had confined the scholars to purely literary research and thus allowed technology improvement to fall into a state of stagnation. China had no national navy and although she had an army of substantial fighting forces, they were poorly trained, poorly led, and poorly equipped. Technology had not provided them modern arms since the seventeenth century, thus they were no match for the Western armies they would face in the Opium War.

The Chinese people had a conviction that their way of life was superior to all others. They had very little knowledge, and even less interest, in what was happening outside their borders, to include the Industrial Revolution and the advance of Western science and technology.<sup>1</sup> They called foreigners of all kinds "foreign devils" and considered them inferior to the Chinese race in all aspects.

The Emperor of China was considered the "Son of Heaven" and was considered by himself and his people superior to all other human beings. To approach him required all to perform the kowtow which acknowledged his superiority.<sup>2</sup> He considered all other nations as vassal states, to include Britain, and he referred to foreigners as "barbarians" and dealt with them as he had dealt with the barbarian tribes and invaders for centuries. Foreign nations nor their representatives had any diplomatic recognition or equality at the governmental level and therefore were at

the mercy of Chinese government rules and regulations.

The Emperor ruled his empire through a series of local Chinese mandarins who enjoyed superiority over everyone and everything under their control. They were left alone to manage the affairs in their regions as they saw fit. The Emperor was only interested in being informed of trouble concerning the foreign barbarians and the native population at the trading ports.<sup>3</sup> In the years of friction and sometimes open war between China and the West, the Canton local officials would often discard the truth and send only dispatches to the Emperor that would be well-received, although entirely false.<sup>4</sup> This procedure deceived the Emperor and left him ignorant of Western military might and the West's real desires in China.

At this critical and exciting time when Western traders were eagerly searching for overseas markets, the Chinese contempt for foreigners, their unreceptiveness to new ideas, and the stagnation of their institutions and technology had not equipped them to deal with the urgent problems that they were soon to face.

#### BRITISH SITUATION PRIOR TO THE OPIUM WAR

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, all foreign trade had been restricted to the port of Canton. Britain had granted the British East India Company a monopoly on the Far East trade and the company had established an organization at Canton to manage the trade between Canton and London. Trade at this time consisted of importing tin, lead, copper, and woolens with export trade being tea, rubarb, silk, and chinaware.

The Emperor had established a Superintendent of Maritime Actions and Trade, or better known as the "Hoppo", as his trade representative in Canton. A parallel

monopolistic guild to the British East India Company, called the "Cohung", was established to regulate trade and act as the intermediary between the Chinese government and the foreign merchants. For now, the East India Company was Britain's sole representative in China to represent Britain in all matters.

Foreigners were not allowed to live in the city of Canton, but had to reside in factories located in the suburbs, and even there only during the trading season, which ran from October to April.<sup>4</sup> Most of the trading community went to the island of Macao during the off-season.<sup>5</sup>

The factories were not factories in the traditional sense, but were the offices and residences of the merchants. They were owned by the Cohung, who rented them to the foreign merchants. No wives were allowed to reside in the factories.<sup>6</sup>

By 1827, British trade with China had become very uneven, as the British were more anxious for Chinese tea than the Chinese were for British goods. The trade imbalance was being offset by silver specie. The British merchants turned to the opium trade to gradually reverse this trade imbalance to the point that China was now paying out silver specie for the illegal opium import. This became one of the factors that helped to provoke the Opium War.<sup>7</sup>

## CHAPTER III

### ESSENTIAL CIRCUMSTANCES FOR USE.

In the 1830's, the illegal opium import trade in China by private merchants of Britain and other nations had reached its summit.<sup>1</sup> New innovations such as the opium clippers were allowing three loads of opium to be imported into China per season vice the one load per season previous to its invention.<sup>2</sup> This vast influx of opium began to have far-reaching, adverse effects on the Chinese society. Initially, consumers of the opium were usually young men of wealthy families, but gradually Chinese people of every description--mandarins, gentry, workers, merchants, women, and even nuns, monks, and priests began to succumb to the addiction of the drug in large numbers.<sup>3</sup> This situation caused tremendous crime, contributed to the corruption of local governments and police forces, sapped the energy and efficiency of the army and local navies, and made a useful and productive life virtually impossible for a great many merchants, sailors, and laborers. Economically, the most conspicuous effect of the illegal opium trade was the drain of the silver specie. China's main currency, from China to many other nations, primarily Great Britain.<sup>4</sup>

To rid the country of these odious conditions, Chinese Emperor, Tao-kuang, despite pressures from some of his advisors and government officials to legalize opium use and trade, made the decision, in 1836, to effectively prohibit the opium trade once and for all. Opium import had been illegal since 1800, but was largely ignored because of the vested interests of all concerned to include Chinese middlemen and officials who had been getting rich from their squeeze of the illegal trade for years.<sup>5</sup> When the Emperor's decision was disseminated down through the

Viceroy of Canton to the Cohung for implementation, it was again largely ignored. Even the Viceroy of Canton was involved in active opium smuggling and his four boats were clearly recognizable as they did their business on the Canton river.<sup>6</sup>

Over the next two years it became apparent that the Emperor's decision to eliminate the opium trade was sincere and a goal he was determined to accomplish. The Imperial Court, which had become corrupt and dishonest, first attracted his attention. After thoroughly reforming it, he turned his attention to the Chinese society and vowed to cure his people of their national vice of opium-smoking. Next he attacked corruption in his government to eliminate such practices as the squeeze. By 1839, the pressure and resolve shown by the Emperor began to have its effects at all levels of Chinese society. A Chinese opium smuggler was publically executed in Macao. The Viceroy of Canton abandoned his smuggling activities and thought it advisable to show the foreign community in Canton that anti-opium edicts were now being fully enforced. He directed that a Chinese opium-seller be executed by strangling in front of the factories where the foreign merchants lived. The foreign merchants intervened and clashed with the local Chinese and executioners, which eventually required Chinese soldiers to disperse the mob.<sup>7</sup> Again, later in 1839, the Viceroy of Canton ordered the execution of another Chinese opium-seller in front of the factories. The foreign merchants, assisted by a British navy ship crew, again intervened and drove the Chinese away. This was followed by a Chinese demonstration against the factories which again erupted into a riot that required the Chinese Army to disperse the crowd.<sup>8</sup>

The Chinese government's consensus of opinion to further curtail the opium problem was for the application of pressure at the source of evil, namely those who supplied, transported, and sold the opium--the foreign merchants.<sup>9</sup>

Emperor Tao-kuang selected Imperial High Commissioner Lin Tse-hsu to carry on his goals for the abolition of opium from Canton. In a memorial to the Emperor, Commissioner Lin had advocated the complete suppression of opium-smoking, and his arguments made all the stronger impression because he had successfully acted on them in his own provinces. Lin was appointed Imperial High Commissioner at Canton, with plenipotentiary powers and command of the local navy. He was sent south to stop the opium trade, a commission which was discretely veiled by the phrase, "to investigate port affairs". The foreign merchants were notified that Lin was coming to suppress the opium trade, and that his aim was to utterly cut off the source of this noxious abuse and to strip bare and root up this enormous evil.<sup>10</sup>

Up until 1833, the East India Company had the monopoly for the regulation and control of British trade with China and had dealt with the Chinese Cohung through a Select Committee made up of their representatives. In August of 1833, the British parliament passed an act which abolished the monopoly and opened up the Chinese market to all British traders.<sup>11</sup> With the abolishment of the East India Company, Britain had severed her only lines of communication with China.

The British government decided to appoint an Officer of the Crown to take the Select Committee's place and represent Britain's interests in China, specifically the commercial trade at the port of Canton. Lord William Napier was chosen for this mission and was given the title of Superintendent of Trade.<sup>12</sup> His guidance was to supervise, represent, and protect British merchants and their ships within the port of Canton. He was to inquire into the possibility of extending British trade to other ports in China and inquire about establishing regular diplomatic relations with the Chinese Emperor's Court in Peking. Napier was to do all this while strictly conforming to the laws and regulations of China, and not provoke war nor enter

into new and unusual relationships with China. He was to reside at Canton and to announce his arrival by letter to the Viceroy of Canton.<sup>13</sup>

Napier arrived at Canton on 13 July 1834, with no status and no accreditation. The government of Britain had not troubled to inform the Emperor of his arrival or even to ask for his formal recognition. The Viceroy of Canton refused to accept any correspondence from Napier that would signify equality.<sup>14</sup> Napier had no intention of humbly waiting for the Emperor to approve of his arrival as, after all, he was the representative of the British community in China, and of Britain's Majesty. He relocated from Macao to the port of Canton and increased his efforts to correspond with the Emperor through the Viceroy of Canton.

Napier had run head-on into the Chinese assumption of superiority to the rest of the world, and soon became keenly aware that a different approach was necessary to effectively deal with the Chinese. He wrote to the British Foreign Minister and recommended that Britain demand a settlement to the situation he was encountering, and if the Emperor proved obdurate, there could be no settlement without a military show of force.<sup>15</sup>

The Viceroy demanded that Napier return to Macao and when he refused, the Viceroy of Canton placed an embargo on all trade with Britain and further withdrew all Chinese labor from the factories and surrounded them with Chinese guards. Napier decided to show the British flag on his own, and ordered two British frigates, that were already in Chinese waters, to force passage of the Bogue and dock at the port of Whampoa. There were shots fired and this incident became known as the "Battle of the Bogue".<sup>16</sup>

After no favorable response from the Chinese government, Napier began to realize the futility of his position and efforts, and decided to return to Macao. To add

to his political difficulties, he had contacted malarial fever. Seriously ill and defeated, Napier was publicly and ceremoniously escorted out of Canton as a clear signal to the Chinese society that he had been defeated. The Chinese again had rebuffed the foreigners and confirmed their belief of superiority over the rest of the world. Napier died on the island of Macao on 11 October 1831. His mission became known as "Napier's Fizzle".<sup>17</sup>

After his departure and subsequent death, trade was reopened and progressed normally the rest of the season. The Vice Superintendent of Trade replaced Napier, and with guidance from the British government, adopted a new policy of "conciliation and quiescence". Although the King of England was indignant over the Napier incident, the new policy was adopted and stood until a new approach to foreign policy in China could be formulated. The British merchants were embarrassed and outraged, and began to voice their displeasure to the British government over the incident. They deprecated strongly a quiet submission to the insult, wanted a plenipotentiary established, backed by warships, demanded the dismissal of the Viceroy of Canton, wanted redress for the trade stoppage, and desired more Chinese ports be opened up to trade opportunities.<sup>18</sup>

In 1836, Lord Palmerston was placed back in office as the British Foreign Minister, and along with this action came the end of the policy of conciliation and quiescence. He placed Charles Elliot, a British Navy Captain, as the Superintendent of Trade. Elliot had accompanied Napier on his earlier efforts and had served under the other two temporary Superintendents of Trade. He convinced Lord Palmerston that Britain should adopt an effort to start over again and endeavor by conciliatory proceedings to win the respect and confidence of the local provincial authorities.<sup>19</sup> Elliot was given permission to put this policy into effect but was enjoined to

communicate directly with the Viceroy of Canton on public matters, and was to refrain from using the character "PIN" in his communications. Plainly speaking, his communications were not to be in the form of a petition from an officer of lower to one of higher rank, but of a letter to an equal.<sup>20</sup>

It was during Elliot's tenure that Emperor Tao-kuang initiated his anti-opium campaign. As the opium clippers were tripling the import of the drug, it became certain there would be trouble soon over the opium trade. In 1837, the British Foreign Office decided it was time for British gunboats to be seen in Chinese waters and suggested the Commander-in-Chief of the East India Station visit China and that warships should be sent there regularly to afford protection to British interests. In this way, the British government accepted the principle that a demonstration of power was needed in China to support the Superintendent of Trade--this equated both to the lawful trading of the merchants at Canton and the illegal opium smuggling in which British merchants were engaged.<sup>21</sup>

By 1839, the warnings of serious trouble over opium were being amply fulfilled with the executions of Chinese opium smugglers in front of the factories.

On 10 March 1839, a graver crisis had arrived at Canton--the crisis which was the final catalysis that lead to the outbreak of the Opium War. This crisis was the arrival of Commissioner Lin Tee-hsu, the man Emperor Tao-kuang had selected to eliminate the opium trade from Canton.

Commissioner Lin was totally dedicated to the mission of eliminating opium from Canton. Before he arrived he wrote a public announcement about the evils of opium and appealed to all people of Canton for help in cooperating with him to suppress the opium-smoking.<sup>22</sup> Next he turned his attention to the foreign merchants. Lin summoned members of the Cohung and presented them with two

edicts, one addressed to themselves and one to the foreign merchants. The one to the Cohung reminded them they were responsible for keeping the foreigners under control, and that some of them would be executed, if they didn't take their responsibilities seriously and execute them vigorously. But the heart of his program was in his edict to the foreigners. His edict informed the foreign merchants, clearly and bluntly, that there must be no more opium imports. They must hand over to the Imperial government all the supplies of the drug they had in storage ships docked in Chinese waters. In addition, all foreign traders must sign a bond promising never again to import opium and agreeing that any breach of the bond should be punished by confiscation of the contraband cargo and the execution of the persons concerned with it. The foreign merchants were given three days to sign the bond.<sup>23</sup>

The following day the Hoppo announced that no foreigners would be allowed to leave Canton and they were confined to the factories until Commissioner Lin completed his "investigations of port activities". The next morning the foreign merchants awoke to find all their servants gone and the factory area surrounded by Chinese soldiers on land and Chinese war junks in the river. The so-called "seige of the factories", which was regarded as an inexcusable insult to the Western world, had begun on 24 March 1839.<sup>24</sup>

Captain Elliot was at Macao at the time Lin came to Canton, and upon learning of the unwelcomed news that British merchants were imprisoned in the factories, he donned his uniform and set sail for Canton. He was clearly unprepared to deal with the formidable Commissioner Lin and, after several attempts to communicate with him failed, it became obvious his only alternative was to surrender the opium. However, he refused to allow British merchants to sign the bond, as it was shocking to think of Westerners signing a document by which they agreed to their own

execution if they infringed its terms.<sup>26</sup>

When the opium was amassed, it was over 20,000 chests of British-owned opium that Elliot had collected from the merchants and agreed to turn over to Commissioner Lin. After receiving the opium in early May 1839, Lin allowed the British merchants to depart Canton and by 24 May 1839, the entire British trading community, to include the office of the Superintendent of Trade, had retreated to Macao.

Elliot wrote to the Foreign Minister that this incident was the first time, in our intercourse with this empire, that its government had taken the unprovoked initiative in aggressive measures against British life, liberty, property, and against the dignity of the British Crown.<sup>26</sup> Captain Elliot realized that the destruction of the confiscated opium and the detention of the foreign community had blocked every avenue for a diplomatic conclusion to the dispute at Canton. He would now seek to launch a campaign for the punishment of China and to open a new era in Chinese trade.<sup>27</sup> Lin had won his first bout with Captain Elliot and the foreigners, but he did not realize what complicated and serious repercussions were to follow. More trouble was sure to come while Commissioner Lin pursued his inflexible course, but neither he nor Elliot would guess that a drunken brawl at a small village would propel the Canton dispute directly to an Anglo-Chinese war.

It was 7 July 1839, that a party of British and American sailors went ashore at the small village of Kowloon. After a heavy drinking spree, they found they could get no more liquor in the village, and showed their displeasure by attacking its inhabitants. During the fighting, a Chinese named Lin Wei-hi was killed. The death of Lin Wei-hi opened a new page in the Anglo-Chinese crisis. Questions of law and sphere of jurisdiction were now to be added to the opium disputes.<sup>28</sup> Lin demanded Elliot arrest the murderer and hand him over for trial as he felt he had

international law behind him that compelled the foreign community in China be subjected to the Chinese law and penal code. Elliot refused, and instead, carried out a preliminary investigation and then arraigned and tried the sailors on 12 August 1839 in a trial by jury on a British ship, with Elliot as the judge. He felt he was acting in accordance with the Act of Parliament, passed in 1833 to regulate the trade to India and China. It gave authority for the Majesty to create a court of justice, with criminal and admiralty jurisdiction for trial offenses committed by his Majesty's subjects within said dimensions of the Empire of China and the ports and havens thereof and on the high seas within one hundred miles of the coast of China.<sup>29</sup> Elliot found the sailors guilty of causing a riot and sentenced them to fines and periods of imprisonment in Britain. He reported his actions and findings to the Chinese authorities.

Lin vehemently disapproved of Elliot's action, and declared that the entire British community be punished for the Trade Superintendent's incompetence. On 15 August 1839, Lin gave orders that all supplies be cut off and all Chinese labor be withdrawn from British merchants and their families, whether at Macao or on-board ships. A few days later the Portuguese Governor of Macao was instructed by Commissioner Lin to expel them from his territory, which he did on 26 August 1839. They embarked in various vessels and came to anchor off the barren island of Hong Kong where the rest of the summer the British merchants and their families lived like "tanks" families in their floating homes.<sup>30</sup>

On 31 August 1839, two British warships arrived off the coast of Hong Kong. With these guns to support him, Elliot went to Kowloon, where in defiance of Lin's orders, he was able to arrange for regular food supplies. On 4 September 1839, some Chinese war junks tried to stop the resupply effort and Elliot promptly opened fire on

them. It was the first British naval action against the Chinese, and in spite of its trifling nature, it is sometimes regarded as the beginning of the first Opium War.<sup>31</sup>

Lin himself was astute enough to realize that such a state of affairs could not continue indefinitely. It was he who began to believe that war was the only way to end the dispute at Canton. He began to build up his naval and military forces with plans to go to the Bogue in preparation for a general assault.<sup>32</sup> Lin was still aggrieved that the British were unwilling to resume normal trading at Canton, and his formal threat of war was accompanied by an edict that all British merchant ships in Chinese waters must come to the port of Canton for trade or leave Chinese waters within three days. Elliot had lost the first round with Commissioner Lin, but with two warships behind him, he had no intention of giving in to Lin again.<sup>33</sup>

Even though he had no formal concurrence from Britain to engage in war with China, Elliot felt he was running out of options. He could no longer wait for Lin to continue building his forces at the Bogue. Experience had taught Elliot that the Chinese recognized reality when they had to, but they were determined, even in the most desperate of times to save face. They could not simply be persuaded--they had to be frightened.

On 3 November 1839, Elliot sent his two warships to Chuenpi, just outside the Bogue, where he had the senior naval officer present a note to the Chinese authorities asking for withdrawal of Lin's military threat, and permission for the British community to live ashore at Hong Kong. The Chinese demanded the surrender of Lin Wei-hi's murderer. When this was refused, the Chinese attacked the two British warships. The junks were no match for the British warships, and the British sank four of the Chinese war junks and inflicted heavy damage on several others. The entire Chinese fleet withdrew to the other side of the Bogue, and Elliot's

desires were accomplished as the threat was temporarily removed. The Opium War between Britain and China was now joined, although months would pass before hostilities were resumed as Elliot was awaiting guidance from England.<sup>34</sup>

In January 1840, Lin decided that all relations between China and Britain must be severed. He issued an edict listing the crimes of British merchants in China, and proclaiming that Britain was to be barred forever from China. Trade was never to be resumed and the products of Britain were not allowed to enter Chinese ports. Emperor Tao-k'ang supported this edict and gave him further instructions to drive British ships out of Chinese waters. The other foreigners could remain as long as they obeyed the law and not give assistance to the British.<sup>35</sup>

Britain responded by deciding to turn their "Phony War" into a shooting war. Elliot's dispatches, describing the "siege of the factories" and surrender of British-owned opium, had been carefully supported by the Foreign Minister and it was decided to support the Superintendent of Trade and the British merchants in China. In February 1840, Britain sent a formal ultimatum to the Imperial Government, demanding restoration of the confiscated goods or a money equivalent, reparations for the imprisonment of the British merchants and the Superintendent of Trade, and security for British trade in the future. The war, the dispatch declared, would go on until China met Britain's claims and signed a treaty in which they were incorporated.<sup>36</sup>

So the situation in China in the early 1840's was such that both Britain and China had decided the only way to settle the dispute at Canton was by war. This war would be called the Opium War.

## CHAPTER IV

### GOALS OF THE ELEMENT OF POWER (OPIUM WAR)

#### CHINESE GOALS

The primary goal the Emperor of China wanted to achieve from the Opium War was the complete elimination of the opium trade, by foreign merchants, at the port of Canton. This had been his goal since 1836, when he declared a prohibition on the opium trade in order to rid his country of the opium-smoking epidemic that was destroying the Chinese society, and draining away China's silver specie.

Based upon his refusal to grant the British Superintendents of Trade equality at the governmental level and the jurisdiction dispute over the murder of Lin Weh-hi, it is prudent to believe that an additional goal of the Emperor was to reinforce the Chinese superiority belief to the British government and all her merchants in China.

#### BRITISH GOALS

The primary goals that Britain wanted to achieve from the Opium War were outlined in a proposed treaty that the Foreign Minister had drafted as part of the instructions for the expeditionary force. These goals are listed below:<sup>1</sup>

a. British subjects of both sexes, with the persons of their establishments, should be allowed to freely reside, without molestation, at the five ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Shanghai, and Ningpo.

b. British consuls or superintendents are to reside at the five ports, be treated with respect, and to enjoy direct communication with Peking.

- c. Reparation for the destroyed opium.
- d. Reparation for the imprisonment of the Superintendent of Trade and the British merchants.
- e. The cession of islands or an island or the grant of factories and permanent arrangements for carrying on the trade in China.
- f. Force China to sign a treaty that incorporates all the above goals.
- g. The treaty would be drawn up in both languages, though the English text was to be the authoritative one. It would also be ratified by the Chinese Emperor and the Queen of England

The continuance of the opium trade was emphatically denied by the British government as a goal for the Opium War. The Foreign Minister included in his instructions for the war, to in no way, dispute the government of China's right to prohibit the importation of opium into China and to confiscate any that might be brought into the country. The problem was that China had entrapped the British merchants by selectively enforcing the prohibition. They had let opium be smuggled in very large quantities and had even participated themselves, then suddenly had turned upon the traffic, and unable to enforce their prohibition, had laid violent hands on the English at Canton. They had made the English prisoners, Elliot included, intending to bring about their deaths. They would have succeeded had not the prisoners purchased their lives with twenty thousand chests of opium. This, and not the prohibition, was the abominable aspect of the case. So Her Majesty's government was prepared to go to war to efface an unjust and humiliating act.<sup>2</sup>

## CHAPTER V

### DETAILS OF THE ELEMENT OF POWER (OPIUM WAR)

The responsibility for building the expeditionary force to carry on the war in China was given to the British Governor-General of India. He put together a force of approximately four thousand ground forces and twenty naval vessels. It was assembled at Singapore, and set sail for the vicinity of Hong Kong in early May 1840.<sup>1</sup> The Honorable Sir George Elliot, cousin of Charles Elliot, the Superintendent of Trade in Canton, was selected to command the force. It was decided the two Elliots would be given plenipotentiary powers to represent England, with Sir George Elliot as the senior plenipotentiary. The instructions given to Elliot by the British Foreign Minister were that he should blockade the port of Canton, occupy the island of Chusan, deliver a letter addressed to the Minister of the Emperor of China, and then sail further north to sign a treaty at the mouth of the Peiho River with a duly accredited representative of the Imperial government.<sup>2</sup> A draft treaty was included in the instructions as well as the letter to the Emperor's minister.<sup>3</sup>

By the end of June 1840, the expeditionary force and its commander and plenipotentiaries were assembled at their destination and ready to pursue the war with China. On 28 June 1840, the blockade of the port of Canton was established with very little resistance from the Chinese. It had very little effect as it caused hardships to the ordinary Chinese, but made no impression on the Imperial government, whose officials were not disturbed by the suffering of the common people.<sup>4</sup>

On 30 June 1840, leaving five ships behind to enforce the blockade, the rest of the expedition set sail to the north to accomplish the occupation of Chusan.

The expedition arrived at Chusan on 4 July 1840 and was relatively unopposed in the occupation of its principal city of Tinghai. As the British soldiers arrived at the city, they found it virtually deserted. All of its citizens had left or were leaving their homes with the exception of the local mandarian, who had committed suicide. At the time this was found surprising, but the next twenty years were to show that suicide was a common Chinese reaction to the occupation of a city by "foreign devils".<sup>5</sup>

Elliot left a ground force at Chusan and on 1 August 1840, set sail for the mouth of the Pieho River to accomplish delivery of the Foreign Minister's letter to the Emperor. Enroute to the Pieho, the Elliots detached two ships to blockade Ningpo and two to guard the mouth of the Yangtze River against Chinese warships. They arrived at the Taku forts, at the mouth of the Pieho River on 15 August 1840 with nine warships and an armed steamer. Taku was in the Chihli province as well as was the city of Peking. This was the first time the indignant Emperor realized that war was now being brought to his own province.<sup>6</sup> Elliot was able to persuade a Taku official to deliver the letter to the Chinese government, who assigned Chi-shan, the Viceroy of Chihli, to open discussions with the British. He was a true master of deception and delaying tactics and scored his first diplomatic victory over the two plenipotentaries by keeping them waiting a month for a definite decision about the opening of discussions. He then convinced the Elliots that it would be better to negotiate at Canton.<sup>7</sup> On 15 September 1840, the Elliots and their expedition departed for the port of Canton.

On the way south to Canton, the expedition stopped by Chusan and discovered a tragic situation. Dysentery, diarrhea, malaria, exhaustion, and intense heat had taken an appalling death toll on the British ground forces that were occupying the island. Additionally, the Chinese had captured some prisoners, one a woman, which

were the first prisoners of the war. These two factors would definitely influence Elliot's decision on the cession of an island in later negotiations.<sup>8</sup> On 20 November 1840, the Elliots departed for Canton to meet Chi-shan to negotiate a settlement to end the Opium War.

The Elliots arrived back at Canton toward the end of November 1840. Sir George Elliot immediately resigned due to ill-health, and returned to England thus leaving Captain Charles Elliot as the sole British plenipotentiary in China. Elliot discovered that High Commissioner Lin had been removed as Viceroy of Canton by the Emperor as he had failed to eliminate the foreign merchants and the opium trade as directed. However, he was retained at Canton to help Chi-shan with negotiations. Captain Elliot felt assured that the removal of his old nemesis would help insure a peaceful settlement.<sup>9</sup>

Throughout December 1840, Elliot was engaged in negotiations with Chi-shan who was more conciliatory in his approach. He realized that on one hand China, for all its vast resources, was too backward in armament to have a chance against Britain, but on the other hand, he could not expect the Emperor to back him up if he completely gave way to all of Elliot's demands.<sup>10</sup> Britain's requirements had been clearly outlined in the instructions for the expedition. The only change Elliot had made was a proposal for the cession of Hong Kong as the island to be taken over by Britain vice Chusan, the unhealthy island where he had encountered so much disease and death.<sup>11</sup> Chi-shan was reluctant to agree to such formidable terms, and resorted to his delaying tactics. After a month of fruitless talks, Elliot abruptly broke off the negotiation attempts and prepared to resume hostilities.<sup>12</sup>

Canton was to be the target of the renewed hostilities and Elliot planned to attack the Bogue forts by land and sea as his army and navy had been reinforced by

replacements from India. On 7 January 1841, he opened fire on the two forts of Chuenpi and Taihoktow with five warships and simultaneously launched a ground attack. The Chinese were no match for the British as both the ground and naval battles were complete successes for the British. Elliot now thought he had given ample demonstration of British strength, and that Chi-shan would be ready to establish an agreement. Little did Elliot know, that on the same day, Emperor Tao-kuang would issue an Imperial edict that directed any petitions from foreigners would be utterly rejected, and should any of their ships sail near ports on the Chinese coast, they should be attacked. There must be no wavering so as to exhibit the slightest degree of fear.<sup>13</sup>

Chi-shan clearly understood the Chinese were no match for the British, and despite the Emperor's edict, he felt he was obligated to prevent further destruction at Canton. So on 20 January 1841, he agreed to enter into serious negotiations with Elliot. After considerable bargaining, on 1 March 1841, the following agreement was reached:<sup>14</sup>

- a. Free access to Canton. British dwellings and persons were to be immune from molestation.
- b. Equality of intercourse on equal terms.
- c. Cession of Hong Kong in lieu of Chusan. However, British forces on Chusan were to be evacuated.
- d. Approval for trial of British subjects at Hong Kong by British officers.
- e. Ratification by a High Officer from each country.
- f. Chi-shan privately agreed to pay the British government \$6,000,000 over a six year period, but did not want this formally included in the agreement.

This agreement became known as the Convention of Chuenpi. Emperor Tao-kuang indignantly rejected the agreement and had Chi-shan relieved and taken to Peking in chains. He issued orders for the resumption of the war and replaced Chi-shan with three new High Commissioners from Peking that would now take charge of the Canton affair.

The British government found the agreement equally objectionable. The Foreign Minister was angry because he felt that Captain Elliot had disobeyed his instructions, and therefore, had not obtained adequate use of the expeditionary force. He had failed to obtain adequate compensation for the opium, had made no arrangements for compensation for the British merchants imprisonment, had given up the island of Chusan for the barren island of Hong Kong, and had failed to secure trade ports farther north.<sup>15</sup> This failure caused the Foreign Minister to make the decision to replace Captain Elliot as plenipotentiary which would eventually occur on 10 August 1841. In the meantime, Captain Elliot was faced with a bigger crisis in the form of new generals, who with orders to annihilate the British, were sent to Canton.

Chinese preparations to renew the hostilities had become so clearly visible that Elliot decided to strike first and on 26 February 1842, he again launched a combined attack against Chinese fortifications around Canton. The British again demonstrated their superiority of weapons and leadership, and by 6 March 1842, had fought their way up the Canton river and had captured the factory area outside the city of Canton. With Canton so dangerously threatened, Yang Fang, one of the new Chinese generals sent to defend Canton, accepted an armistice and agreed that trade should be re-opened at Canton--clearly against the Emperor's orders.<sup>16</sup> So in the middle of the Opium War, trade was resumed and the British flag again flew over the

factories at the port of Canton.

Both the British merchants and the Chinese citizenry widely expected this was only an interlude in the war. However, both the Chinese and British suffered when trade was interrupted, and Elliot wanted to salvage the British trade for the season. In reality, the armistice allowed the Chinese to buy time to prepare for another attack as their reinforcements were steadily reaching Canton and their defenses were being strengthened daily.

In May 1842, Captain Elliot had moved back to the factory and brought his wife with him. He began to receive reports of a huge Chinese encampment that had been built outside the city. Upon verification, he advised all foreigners to evacuate the factories on 21 May 1842. The evacuation was timely as that same evening looting broke out in the factory area which ended with the factories being burned. Additionally, the Chinese attacked the British ships lying off Canton with gunfire and fire-rafts.<sup>17</sup> In the next few days over seventy Chinese war junks were destroyed by British warships.

On 24 May 1842, a ground attack was launched with approximately 3,500 British troops against approximately 45,000 Chinese. With resolute leadership, disciplined soldiers, and superiority of arms, the British fought their way to a position overlooking the city of Canton by the evening of 25 May 1842.<sup>18</sup> The next morning a remarkable sight greeted them as they looked down on the city. People were pouring out of the city trying to escape before the British descended upon them. This never happened, as Elliot suspended hostilities in an attempt to negotiate with the Chinese. He thought he had an opportunity to get what he wanted without further fighting.<sup>19</sup> His terms for not pressing the attack was the removal of the three Generals from Canton, six million dollars compensation for use by the Crown of England.

and compensation given for the destruction of the factories. British troops would remain in position until the money was paid. The week ended, the money was paid, and British troops returned back to Hong Kong. This action became known as "The Ransom of Canton". Shortly after, Captain Charles Elliot was replaced by Rear-Admiral Richard Parkes, and the new plenipotentiary was Sir Henry Pottinger.<sup>20</sup>

Pottinger's guidance was to form another British expedition force to move northward to the city of Peking with the goals of recapturing the island of Chusan and making the Chinese accept all the essential terms that Elliot had left out of the Convention of Chuenpi agreement. He was to urge the Chinese to legalize the opium trade, but not to force the Chinese to do it against their will. Lastly, equality of treatment must be achieved above all else.<sup>21</sup>

Upon his arrival at Macao, he sent a representative to the city of Canton to announce his arrival and appointment, and to inform the Chinese government of British demands. He made it clear that he would not enter into communications with any representative of the Emperor not accredited with full powers.<sup>22</sup>

The effect of Pottinger's arrival was felt immediately as he was not inclined to pay any special attention to the trading arrangements at Canton. He wanted them to know his mission was simply to bring the scene of operations nearer to Peking so as to force the Emperor to come to terms. Pottinger believed it was clear that more convincing proof of European superiority must be given so the Son of Heaven could be made to understand the real situation his empire faced.<sup>23</sup>

By August 1842, the expedition was ready to move northward. The force consisted of approximately 2,700 soldiers and forty-seven ships of which nine were warships. The operation would consist of a combined ground and sea approach. Their first objective would be Amoy, three hundred miles to the northeast.<sup>24</sup>

Amoy was reached on 25 August 1842, and surrendered two days later with very few British casualties. Leaving a small garrison force, the expedition set out for the city of Tinghai on the island of Chusan, which the British had held the year before, but had evacuated for the island of Hong Kong. The attack on Tinghai commenced in late September 1842 and ended with surrender on 1 October 1842, again with very few casualties. The expedition was soon ready to continue its northward advance. The next objective, Chinhai, at the mouth of the Ningpo River fell on 10 October 1842, with the city surrendering three days later without much of a fight. At each city the British left a small garrison force to secure the city.

The British decided to settle in the city of Ningpo for the winter, as it was early November and too late in the year for further campaigning. While the British set in for the winter, Emperor Tao-kuang had no intention of allowing his country to be overrun by the foreigners. He found a new general, I-ching, and ordered him to drive the British out of Chinhai and Ningpo. I-ching launched his counterattack against the two cities in March 1842. Both attacks failed miserably and I-ching was recalled to Peking and charged with having wasted men and money. He was sentenced to death for his failure.<sup>25</sup>

The expedition resumed its move northward on 7 May 1842 with the goal of reaching the mouth of the Yangtze-kiang River and proceeding up river to capture the city of Nanking. Their next objective was the island of Chapu where they encountered their strongest resistance to date in the form of the Tartars. Though the Tartars fought a gallant battle, the British arms superiority prevailed, and after a four hour battle, Chapu was surrendered.<sup>26</sup> As the British entered Chapu, they encountered a city of horror. Tartar soldiers had killed themselves when they realized they were beaten. Women and children, in terror of the invaders, had

drowned or hanged their children and then followed them to death. Some Tartars had hanged their wives and then cut their own throats.<sup>27</sup> The British didn't stay long at Chapu as it had been captured merely to clear their way northward and now was a dreadful place from all the death. So, on 27 May 1842, the expedition departed for the mouth of the Yangtse-kiang, with intentions of occupying the city of Shanghai on their way. On 19 June 1842, the British entered Shanghai without a fight and the expedition began to prepare for their final objective--the historical city of Nanking.

By mid July 1842, the expedition was ready to embark on their final objective. The opening stage would be primarily a naval operation, which required the taking of twenty-six warships and forty transports up two hundred miles of uncharted waters of the Yangtse-kiang. At the intersection of the Yangtse-kiang and the Grand Canal, the expedition encountered stiff resistance from the city of Chinkiang.<sup>28</sup> After bitter fighting, in unbearable heat, the British soldiers entered the city on 21 July 1842. They found the horrors of Chapu repeated to the point that the Manchu race in the city could now be considered extinct.<sup>29</sup>

The expedition departed for Nanking on 29 July 1842, and reached their final objective on 9 August 1842. As they were preparing to launch their assault, three Commissioners arrived from Peking that were sent to make peace. The Emperor had finally realized his city was truly in danger of invasion. Even his confidence in China's superiority to the rest of the world could not absolve the fact that foreign devils had brought large warships to the gates of Nanking. With the arrival of the Commissioners, the attack was called off and on 17 August 1842, hostilities were suspended.<sup>30</sup> It was just short of one year since the expedition had left Hong Kong. Now victory and peace were at hand, as it appeared to the British they had

accomplished their goals and the war was all but over. Sir Henry Pottinger summoned the commissioners to the H.M.S. Cornwallis to deliver the terms of the treaty, which were almost exactly those the Foreign Minister had prescribed two years earlier. No argument about the terms was allowed as Pottinger expected them to accept and sign the treaty as it was presented. It is said that Chi-ying, the chief negotiator for the Emperor, did not even read it before he accepted and signed it.

So the Opium War ended with China signing its first treaty with a foreign country since 1688. The treaty became known as the Treaty of Nanking and unlike Elliot's earlier treaty, the Convention of Chuenpi, this treaty was duly approved by the Emperor and the British government. Ratifications were exchanged in Hong Kong the following June. It was an excellent treaty for Britain and consisted of the following provisions:<sup>31</sup>

- a. Provided for the cession of Hong Kong.
- b. Opened five ports to Britain for trade (Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, Canton, and Shanghai).
- c. Payment of \$21,000,000 indemnity to Britain.
  - (1) \$3,000,000 for the Hong merchants debt.
  - (2) \$12,000,000 for expenses for the expeditionary force.
  - (3) \$6,000,000 compensation for the confiscated opium.
- d. Abolition of the Cohung trading monopoly.
- e. Introduction of a uniform and moderate tariff on imports and exports.
- f. Equality between British and Chinese officials of equal rank.

What followed the Treaty of Nanking was the Treaty of Wanghai (United States) and the Treaty of Whampoa (France), all with basically the same agreements with China, less cession of islands, as the Treaty of Nanking. Certainly times had changed

in China. A so called era of good feeling would begin, and the opening of the new ports brought greater prosperity to the British opium traders.<sup>32</sup>

## CHAPTER VI

### COORDINATION WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF POWER

During the timeframe leading up to and including the Opium War, there was considerable coordination by the British with the other elements of power in an effort to achieve free trade and equality, the primary ends of this military action against China. The details of this coordination are outlined below:

#### a. Political/Diplomatic

(1) Diplomatic Recognition. The British had consistently tried to establish diplomatic relations with China since the early 1800's. They clearly understood this was a critical link in developing their trade interests in the region and in representing the growing British contingent in China. No matter how resolute the British were in their quest, every attempt ended in failure. This was primarily due to the Chinese belief of their superiority over the rest of the world. These rebuffs by the Chinese were the ultimate cause that prompted the British to resort to war to achieve their goals. Attempts to establish diplomatic recognition are outlined below:

(a.) Admiral Drury Attempt. In 1808, Admiral Drury landed at Macao with the purpose of a liaison with the Viceroy of Canton. Upon receipt of a refusal, he set sail for Canton, but was fired upon from the Chinese forts in the vicinity of the Bogue. In the interest of peace, he did not return fire with his warships and withdrew from China.<sup>1</sup> This action perpetuated Chinese claim of superiority and was clearly instrumental in forming future British attitudes for establishment of diplomatic relations with China.

(b.) Lord Amherst Attempt. In February 1816, the British again made an attempt to establish diplomatic recognition with China as British trade was on the increase with interests in expanding to other ports in China. Lord Amherst took his warships and made his way to the city of Tientsin. From there he was escorted to Peking on an official barge which bore the humiliating sign of "Tribute Bearer," for England was included on the Manchu list of vassal or tributary countries. After an all-night trip, and being tired, unwashed, and disheveled upon his arrival, he was instructed on kowtow procedures and pressured for an immediate audience with the Emperor.<sup>2</sup> Lord Amherst refused both and was dismissed and turned away from Peking the same day. The Amherst embassy would serve to build upon the previous failures, and convince the British that the only two options for dealing with China were to abandon the trade or resort to war.

(c). William J. Napier Attempt. In 1833, with the abandonment of the East India Company monopoly, Britain decided to send a formal officer of the British government to China with the title of Superintendent of Trade. He was to manage trade at Canton, seek expansion of trade to other Chinese ports, and establish communications with the Imperial Court at Peking. Upon his arrival at Macao, he was denied communications with the Viceroy of Canton. Napier took his warships to Canton, but was still refused communications with the government who, because of Napier's arrival, had placed an embargo on British trade at Canton. Napier realized his defeat and was subjected to harassment and embarrassment as he was publicly escorted out of Canton. This action served to ignite stern reaction from British merchants for swift and immediate military retaliation from the British government. This rebuff would confirm that diplomatic recognition could only be achieved through war.

(d). Charles Elliot Attempt. In 1837, Captain Charles Elliot was appointed as the British Superintendent of Trade in China. He had experience in China and decided on his own that if he could get to Canton, he could establish diplomatic relations. He sent a petition to the Viceroy of Canton with the "PIN" sign on it which admitted British inferiority to China. After being admitted to Canton, he was still denied direct diplomatic recognition on equal terms by the Imperial government.<sup>3</sup> Captain Elliot was sympathetic to the Chinese situation and could have been a true ally for China. This rebuff led him to sway his beliefs toward war being the only way to deal with China and made strong recommendations to this effect.

(2). Policy Statement.

(a). Bond Denial. In March 1839, Commissioner Lin, Viceroy of Canton, demanded all foreign merchants sign a bond promising never to import opium again and agreeing that any breach of the bond would result in confiscation of the contraband and death by execution of persons concerned.<sup>4</sup> The British Superintendent of Trade refused to allow British merchants to sign a document that could result in death if violated. This refusal was a policy statement to the Chinese over matters of jurisdiction and would be included as a goal for the war with China.

(b). Extraterritoriality Statement. In July 1839, British and American sailors killed a Chinese citizen in a drunken brawl. The Commissioner of Canton demanded the perpetrators be handed over to him for trial. The British Superintendent of Trade refused and conducted a trial by jury for the individuals concerned. He found them guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment in Britain. This policy statement of jurisdiction and extraterritoriality led to an embargo on British trade and the forced removal of the British merchants and their families from Macao to the barren island of Hong Kong. It would be the deciding factor that

would lead both countries into the Opium War.

(c). British Government Ultimatum. In February 1840, the British government decided to resort to force to deal with the situation in China. Lord Palmerston, British Foreign Minister, sent a formal ultimatum to the Imperial government that demanded restoration of the confiscated opium or a monetary equivalent, payment for the imprisonment of the British merchants and the Superintendent of Trade, and security for British trade in the future. If not met, the war, he declared, would go on until China acquiesced to Britain's claims and signed a treaty in which they were incorporated.<sup>5</sup> The Imperial government ignored the ultimatum which was the last attempt by the British to prevent war. Their next action was to engage in war as an element of power to achieve their goals.

(3). Diplomatic Agreement. On 20 January 1841, Captain Charles Elliot entered into an agreement with the Viceroy of Canton that would have ended the Opium War with China. This agreement became known as the Convention of Chuenpi, and covered only a few of the points that the British Foreign Minister had directed to be achieved in his initial instructions. The Viceroy of Canton entered into this agreement in violation of an Imperial edict. The agreement would have ended the war, but became a lost endeavor as both governments repudiated the agreement. The Viceroy of Canton was relieved and taken to Peking in chains. It caused Elliot to be replaced later. The Opium War continued on for another year.

b. Economic.

(1). Opium Surrender. Shortly after Commissioner Lin arrived at Canton, he demanded the surrender of all opium that foreign merchants had in Chinese waters. Lin then confined all foreigners to the factories until surrender of the opium was complete. The British Superintendent of Trade ensured all opium was

turned over as directed, which totaled approximately 20,000 chests. By doing this, he gained freedom for the foreign merchants from the factories. This act served to gain British governmental and public support for war as the means to achieve freedom of trade and equality for the British in China.

(2). Counter-Embargo of Canton. Upon release of the foreign merchants from the factories, the Superintendent of Trade moved the entire trading community to Macao. He implemented an embargo on Canton in an effort to deny China trade from the Western nations. This act led to a buildup of Chinese army and naval forces at Canton and led to an edict to the British that all ships must come to Canton for trade or exit Chinese waters within three days. For the British merchants, this act served as a rallying point to pull the merchants together to pursue British retaliation for the Chinese acts.

(3). Sparing of Canton. On two occasions, Captain Charles Elliot halted military operations when they were on the verge of attacking the city of Canton. On one of these occasions, British forces had fought their way to a hill overlooking the city. The next morning, as the Army looked down upon the city, it was being evacuated to avoid the impending attack. Elliot terminated the action short of an attack on the city in order to salvage the British trade for the season. This was something he valued above his position as head of the expedition. This action had a positive impact upon the merchants as it allowed the trade to proceed, but created great dissatisfaction among the ground force commanders who had fought hard, at the expense of their soldiers, to achieve the position to attack Canton. These actions had no effect on the war as it failed to achieve or support the ends Britain had established for the war.

(4). Chinese Subsidy of the War. Included in the Foreign Minister's

instructions to Elliot was the requirement for China to pay for the expenses of the expedition. War was very expensive and this method helped relieve the British government of the great expense of the war. Additionally, it was a means to soothe many skeptical British citizens, who questioned the value of the war compared to the great expense.

c. Socio-Psychological.

(1). British Proclamation. The Opium War was never a war between the English and the Chinese people, but one between two governments in which both were victims of untoward circumstances.<sup>6</sup> Sir Henry Pottinger supported this by issuing a proclamation to the Chinese government before he left Shanghai for Nanking. It simply stated that it was the Imperial government, not the Chinese people who the English government was fighting. Pottinger issued this proclamation because reconnaissance had shown that Nanking was heavily defended by entrenchment of Chinese troops. He knew the fighting would be heavy and wanted to prevent the further Tartar suicides and atrocities he had encountered at Chapu, Ningpo, and Chinhai.

(2). Humane Treatment of the Chinese. The British leadership placed great efforts on ensuring humane treatment of the Chinese people during the Opium War. Upon attack and entry into a city, British leaders prohibited looting and mistreatment of the civilians, and on many occasions, used British troops to prevent Chinese bandits and robbers from looting the cities. The British would provide medical treatment when possible. They would also take from the city only what could be reasonably expected under the circumstances. In those cities that Britain invaded more than once, reaction to the British soldiers by the population was much calmer than the first entry. Humane treatment had worked favorably for the British image

and mission during the war.

d. Military.

(1). Show of Force.

(a). Gunboat Force Projection. In 1836, it was apparent to the British Foreign Minister that the British Superintendent of Trade needed more support. British trade, commercial and the opium, was in jeopardy by the recent actions taken by the Emperor to eliminate opium from the country. The Foreign Minister decided that warships should be sent to the region regularly to demonstrate British power and provide support for the trading community. These gunboat demonstrations proved to have very little effect on the Chinese decisions that eventually led to the Opium War.

(b). Convention of Chuenpi. Upon arrival at the mouth of the Pieho River, the Chinese negotiator persuaded Elliot, leader of the British expedition, to return to Canton for promised negotiations. Delaying tactics at Canton convinced Elliot that a demonstration of force was required to show British might and resolve to end the war. Elliot unleashed a combined naval and ground operation against the facilities surrounding Canton, with great success. This demonstration of force resulted in the Viceroy of Canton accepting an agreement with Elliot. Both the Emperor and British government rejected the agreement, and the Opium War continued on for more than a year.

(2). Ransom of Canton. In May 1842, Elliot had lost the support of the Foreign Minister, and it was apparent he was to be replaced. While he was waiting, he discovered a large buildup of forces outside of Canton and it appeared an attack was imminent. He evacuated the factories just before the Chinese attack was launched on the factories and ships lying off of Canton. A combined counterattack was initiated against the Chinese with British superior leadership, tactics, and arms.

leading to a position that the British soldiers could have captured Canton. Elliot halted the attack, and demanded \$6,000,000 for not pressing the attack further. This, in his mind would help compensate Britain for the expedition and for burning the factories. He also felt his army was too small and could not effectively occupy a city the size of Canton. For the Chinese, this failure to pursue the attack led the Emperor to believe that the British ground force had been defeated. Thus, when the war could have been ended, both sides ensured the war would continue.

(3). Blockade of Canton. The operational plan for the first British expedition of the Opium War called for the trade blockade at the port of Canton and then sail to the mouth of the Picho River to negotiate a treaty. The blockade was established, but it was quickly discovered that it had very little impact on ending the war since it only affected the common Chinese. The Chinese government was too isolated to feel its effects. However, it was kept in effect until the expediton returned to Canton for negotiation of the treaty. It began to have some effect later as it was combined with a British demonstration of force in an effort to obtain a treaty.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION

#### RELEVANCE OF THE ELEMENT OF WAR TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

It was the search for commerce that brought the British to the shores of China in the nineteenth century. As the trade began to grow, Britain started attempts to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese government, as was standard foreign policy for Britain. What Britain encountered was the Chinese attitude of superiority and a total refusal to treat westerners as equals, let alone establish diplomatic relations. As Britain began to demonstrate her might and exert more pressures for equality, local Chinese officials elected to deceive the Emperor by withholding the real truth about the desires and strength of the British. This resulted in ignorance on the part of the Emperor in making decisions dealing with the British in his country.

Unfortunately, the opium trade erupted as the focal point of dissention between the two nations in the 1830's. Although illegal since 1794, the Chinese allowed it to proceed freely until the country found herself faced with a critical drug crisis. With very little notice, the Emperor decided to effectively and totally eliminate opium entirely from China, to include the suppliers, and pursued this goal relentlessly. This pursuit evolved into Chinese confinement of British merchants to the factories, which included the British Superintendent of Trade, confiscation of 20,000 chests of British-owned opium, and expulsion of the entire trading community from Macao to Hong Kong.

China's attitude was one that demanded complete submission of the British

community to her demands, and ended with an Imperial edict to drive the British from Chinese waters. With no chance of diplomatic negotiations, Britain found herself faced with the options of abandonment of all trade and withdrawal from the region, submission to Chinese tyranny and superiority, or declaring a state of war with China. Based upon her position as the greatest Colonial power in the world at the time and with support from the British public, selection of the element of war was appropriate, and certainly relevant to the circumstances that had been created by the Imperial government. British and Chinese attitudes both would have accepted nothing less than war.

#### EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OPIUM WAR.

With the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, Britain had achieved every objective it had established for the war. From the British perspective, they had gained enough capital to finance the expedition, secured trade--especially their precious tea, expanded trade opportunities, had received an island named Hong Kong, and most importantly had achieved equality and defeated the dreaded ~~Kowtow~~. An additional benefit was the opening of China's markets to other Western nations, to include America. Two unstated goals not achieved were the legalization of the opium trade and diplomatic equality in Peking. However, the opium trade reverted back to the status of toleration that it had enjoyed before the Opium War. For Britain, the Opium War could not have been much more effective, as it had certainly led to the achievement of all of Britain's interests in the area.

For China, the Opium War exposed the inviability of the Manchu regime, the stagnation of Chinese technology, and the inadequacy of the national defense system. The roaring guns of the Opium War had awakened the empire from centuries of

lethargy. This helped to usher in a new era in Chinese history, as the nation started on the path toward modernization.<sup>1</sup>

#### RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS.

Carl Von Clausewitz wrote that the political objective or purpose is the goal and war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation. In my opinion, the Opium War is a good testimonial for this statement. Britain's political objectives or ends to be achieved in China were always well-known. As the political objective (ends) became threatened, Britain decided to further emphasize them by sending warships (ways) to China for a demonstration of power (means). With the Emperor of China's edicts to eliminate the opium trade and drive the British from Chinese waters, the British government decided war (means) was then necessary to achieve its political objectives (ends) in China. It was decided that a military expedition (ways), composed of ground and naval forces, would be sent to China to pursue the war. On each occasion, the British Foreign Minister clearly identified the political objectives (ends) to be gained by declaring war (means), either in writing or by personal audience. Even during the conduct of the war (means), attempts were consistently made to end the war (means) by negotiating to achieve stated political objectives (ends). In the end, superior military leadership, manpower, arms and consistent public support led to winning the war and achieving all the political objectives outlined for the war. As Clausewitz outlined, keeping a close relationship between the ends, ways, and means allowed the British to achieve their interests in the region.

### RECOMMENDATIONS.

My analysis has surfaced the fact that there are many parallels that exist between the drug situation in China that led to the Opium War and the drug situation that the United States faces today. Although there are some significant differences, the most notable being the United States military capabilities versus China's at the time, an analysis of the Opium War with a concentration toward the Chinese view, could possibly produce historical lessons that could be applied to the situation in the United States today. This is a topic that is worthy of a future military studies program paper.

Another area this analysis surfaced that deserves more study is the morality and ethics issues that evolved around the war. Especially, since Britain, France, Portugal, and the United States were all heavily involved in the illegal opium trade in China--when all clearly knew it was in violation of the law. Additionally, many Chinese merchants and government officials were readily participating in the smuggling game at the expense of the Chinese society. From a morality and ethics perspective, the study of the Opium War is a classic example that could provide valuable insights in these areas.

## CHAPTER VIII

### EPILOGUE

With the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, British and Chinese relations would enter an "Era of Good Feelings". British troops had departed, trade was expanding, diplomatic relations were improving, and opium had ceased to be a source of friction. Emperor Tao-kuang had adopted a policy of tolerance and conciliation which would span the period from 1842 until his death in 1856.

However, the clouds of war would start to form again as soon as Emperor Tao-kuang died and was replaced by Hsien-feng. His staunch anti-foreigner attitude and position soon signified he had no intentions of adhering to the provisions of the Treaty of Nanking and it became clear that the "Era of Good Feelings" was over. By 1856, he had China and Britain back at war over an incident involving a Chinese boat named the "Arrow", and jurisdiction over its crew. This war became known as the Arrow War. Like opium was to the Opium War, the "Arrow" was only an occasion to the Arrow War. The real cause was basically the same for Britain as the Opium War, that of equality and free trade. Local British efforts failed to end this conflict in favor of Britain and it was decided by the British government that another expeditionary force was necessary.

So the Arrow War would lead to a joint British/French expedition, which would force open the formidable city of Canton to foreigners and further sail to the mouth of the Pieho River which resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Tintseen. This treaty would enhance Anglo equality of status in China, would further facilitate trade between China and the Western world, and would finally legalize the opium trade. This action would become known as the Anglo-Chinese War. However, the

British and French refused to be duped by Chinese insincerity again as had happened with the Treaty of Nanking. The Anglo-Chinese War was pursued until entry to the Celestial City of Peking was gained in October 1860. The Emperor fled Peking to Mongolia before the British soldiers reached the city. He later died there in exile. The new Chinese Emperor agreed to and signed the "Convention of Peking" on 24 October 1860, which signified the end of the so called series of wars that altogether are known as the Opium Wars. Britain had finally achieved her goals of free trade and equality. The military forces were withdrawn from the Chinese mainland and would not return to fight in China until the Boxer Rebellion of 1900.

By far the two most important results of the Opium Wars between 1840-1860 were the achievement of formal diplomatic relations and the opening of China's doors to Western trade. However, it would be thirteen more years before the Emperor would give audiences to foreign ambassadors and took China until 1879 to send her own ambassadors to the West. Yet, the treaty ports continued to expand and foreign merchants could trade in China with a freedom they had not experienced before. Western influences were now to be dominant in China's international relations, and would remain so until they were swept away in the twentieth century by the emergence of new men, new measures, and a new China.<sup>1</sup>

## ENDNOTES

1. Chang, Hsin-pao, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, (New York, 1963), p. 15.
2. Holt, Edgar, The Opium Wars in China, (Pennsylvania, 1964), p. vii.
3. Chang, Hsin-pao, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, p. 15.

### (Chapter 2)

1. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 23.
2. The kowtow, which British envoys to China characteristically refused to perform, was a series of three kneelings, in each of which the subject or tribute bearer would make separate prostrations, bringing his nose to the floor. The kowtow was a conventional courtesy in China, just as the British knealt before the King. Early British embassies to China, Lord Drury, 1808, and Lord Amherst, 1816, would not prostrate themselves to a Chinese Emperor more humbly than they knealt before their own King.
3. Costin, W.C., Great Britain and China 1833-1860, (London, 1968), p. vi.
4. Luard, Evan, Britain and China, (London, 1923), p. 20. Additionally, the British merchants were not allowed to bring their wives with them to China, not allowed to learn the Chinese language, ride in a carried chair, row on the Canton River, nor walk in the streets of the city of Canton.
5. Macao is a small peninsula, south of Canton at the extremity of the Chinese mainland. The Chinese government had granted Portugal a permanent lease on it for cooperation in suppression of pirates. It evolved into a Western outpost on the Chinese coast. Macao became the home for most of the Western merchants between trading seasons.
6. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 33.
7. Ibid., p. 37.

### (Chapter 3)

1. By 1832, the opium duty was providing 1/18th of Britain's gross revenue and rose to as high as 1/7th later in the century.
2. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 65.
3. Chang, Hsin-pao, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, p. 32.

4. Ibid. p. 34.
5. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 71.
6. Ibid. p. 71.
7. Chang, Hsin-pao, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, p. 113.
8. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 77.
9. Chang, Hsin-pao, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, p. 93.
10. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, pp. 77-78.
11. Ibid. pp. 43-44.
12. Fay, Peter Ward, The Opium War 1840-1842, (New York, 1967), p. 67.
13. Ibid. pp. 68-69.
14. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 52.
15. Ibid. p. 55.
16. Ibid. pp. 56-57.
17. Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, pp. 78-79.
18. Costin, W.C., Great Britain and China 1833-1860, p. 27. A plenipotentiary is a diplomatic official that has been granted full power and authority by a government to act as that government's representative.
19. Ibid. p. 34.
20. Ibid. p. 35.
21. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, pp. 74-75.
22. Ibid. p. 79.
23. Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, p. 144.
24. Ibid. p. 145.
25. Ibid. p. 147.
26. Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, p. 178.
27. Ibid. p. 179.
28. Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, p. 171.

29. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, pp. 86-87.
30. Ibid. p. 87.
31. Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, p. 175.
32. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 90.
33. Ibid. p. 91.
34. Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, pp. 178-179.
35. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 93.
36. Ibid. p. 96.

(Chapter IV)

1. Costin, W.C., Great Britain and China 1833-1860, pp. 75-76.
2. Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, pp. 194-195.

(Chapter V)

1. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 97.
2. Ibid. p. 106.
3. Costin, W.C., Great Britain and China 1833-1860, p. 76.
4. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 107.
5. Ibid. p. 107.
6. Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, p. 249.
7. Costin, W.C., Great Britain and China 1833-1860, p. 82.
8. Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, p. 267.
9. Ibid. p. 268.
10. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 116.
11. Ibid. p. 116.
12. Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, p. 271.
13. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 118.
14. Costin, W.C., Great Britain and China 1833-1860, pp. 87-88.

15. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, pp. 119-120.
16. Ibid. p. 124.
17. Ibid. p. 125.
18. Ibid. p. 126.
19. Ibid. p. 127.
20. Ibid. p. 128.
21. Ibid. p. 134.
22. Costin, W.C., Great Britain and China 1833-1860, p. 96.
23. Rait, Robert, S., The Life and Campaigns of Hugh First Viscount Gough, Field Marshall, (Westminster, 1903), p. 207.
24. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 136.
25. Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, p. 319.
26. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 143.
27. Ibid. p. 144.
28. Ibid. p. 146.
29. Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, p. 353.
30. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 148.
31. Ibid. p. 152.
32. Ibid. p. 162.

(Chapter VI)

1. Soothill, W.E., China and the West, (London, 1925), p. 98.
2. Ibid. p. 101.
3. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, pp. 73-74.
4. Chang, Hsin-pao, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, pp. 142-143
5. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 95.
6. Ibid. p. 145.

(Chapter VII)

1. Chang, Hsin-pao, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, p. 217.

(Chapter VIII)


1. Holt, The Opium Wars in China, p. 283.

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
1. Chang, Hsin-pao, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1964.
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## **APPENDIX 1**


## TAKOO TO PEKING



#### M O N G O L I A




CHINA



HONG KONG AND CANTON

WHAMPOA AND CANTON



## **APPENDIX 2**

OPIUM EXPORTED from BENGAL and BOMBAY and  
IMPORTED to CANTON on BRITISH ACCOUNTS, 1816-1840

Opium tables often differ from one another. The discrepancy usually arises from different statistical bases. Theoretically a complete table should contain all opium supplied to China, not only that produced in British India, but also that produced in Portuguese India and Turkey; not only that imported by the British, but also that brought in by other nationals; not only that delivered at Canton, Lintin, and Macao, but also what was smuggled in on the eastern and northern coast. Owing to the surreptitious nature of the trade, such a complete table cannot be compiled.

The export column in this appendix contains only opium produced in British India from which the East India Company (EIC) derived a profit. Since it does not include Turkish and Portuguese products, the amount in some cases is below that of the imports in the corresponding seasons. The import column in this appendix contains only opium delivered at the port of Canton (including Lintin) by British traders; therefore the figures are considerably lower than what was exported from British India in the 1830s. The smuggling on the coast east of Canton began to be of importance in the 1832-33 season and, to quote McCulloch, it "bids fair to exceed that carried on at the Lintin station."

The export figures here are taken from a table entitled "Tabular View of the Quantity of Opium Exported from Bengal and Bombay, with the Profits Derived therefrom by the East India Company," inclosure 4 in dispatch No. 26 from Sir J. Bowring to the Earl of Clarendon, dated Hong Kong, Jan. 8, 1856, printed in *Parliamentary Papers: Papers relative to the Opium Trade in China, 1842-1856*, p. 50. The import figures are based mainly on: (1) statistical statements submitted to the Committee of the House of Commons on the East India Company's Affairs by Charles Marjoribanks in 1830, printed in *Parliamentary Papers: Opium Trade*, p. 33; (2) statements of the British trade at Canton published by order of the superintendent (Appendix C); (3) J. R. McCulloch, *A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical, and Historical, of Commerce and Commercial Navigation* (London, 1854), II, 939.

## OPIUM IMPORTS

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Years	IMPORTS TO CANTON						EXPORTS FROM BENGAL AND BOMBAY	
	Bengal (Patna & Benares)		Malwa		Total		Profits by EIC (rupees)	
	Chests	Value \$	Chests	Value \$	Chests	Value \$		
1816-17	2,610	3,132,000	600	525,000	3,210	3,657,000	4,618	-
1817-18	2,530	3,200,450	1,150	703,800	3,680	3,904,250	3,692	-
1818-19	3,050	3,050,000	1,530	1,109,250	4,580	4,159,250	3,552	-
1819-20	2,970	3,667,950	1,630	1,915,250	4,600	5,583,200	4,006	-
1820-21	3,050	5,795,000	1,720	2,605,800	4,770	8,400,800	4,244	-
1821-22	2,910	6,038,250	1,718	2,276,350	4,628	8,314,600	5,576	-
1822-23	1,822	2,828,930	4,000	5,160,000	5,822	7,988,930	7,773	-
1823-24	2,910	4,656,000	4,172	3,859,100	7,082	8,515,100	8,895	-
1824-25	2,655	3,119,625	6,000	4,500,000	8,655	7,619,625	12,023	-
1825-26	3,442	3,141,755	6,179	4,466,450	9,621	7,608,205	9,373	-
1826-27	3,661	3,668,565	6,308	5,941,520	9,969	9,610,085	12,175	-
1827-28	5,114	5,105,073	4,361	5,251,760	9,475	10,356,833	11,154	-
1828-29	5,960	5,604,235	7,171	6,928,880	13,131	12,533,115	15,418	-
1829-30	7,143	6,149,577	6,857	5,907,580	14,000	12,057,157	16,877	-
1830-31	6,660	5,789,794	12,100	7,110,237	18,760	12,900,031	17,456	11,012,826
1831-32	5,672	5,484,340	7,831	5,447,355	13,503	10,931,695	22,138	13,269,945
1832-33	8,167	6,551,059	15,403	8,781,700	23,570	15,332,759	19,483	9,742,886
1833-34	8,672	6,545,845	11,114	7,510,695	19,786	14,056,540	23,902	11,110,385
1834-35	7,767	4,431,845	8,749	5,223,125	16,516	9,654,970	21,011	7,768,605
1835-36	11,992	8,838,000	14,208	8,550,622	26,200	17,388,622	30,202	14,920,068
1836-37	8,078	5,848,236	13,430	8,439,694	21,508	14,287,930	34,033	15,349,678
1837-38	6,165	3,903,129	13,875	6,980,038	20,040	10,883,157	34,373	15,864,440
1838-39	-	-	-	-	-	-	40,200	9,531,308
1839-40	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,619	3,377,775
1840-41	-	-	-	-	-	-	34,631	8,742,776